Assess the importance of the Viet Cong in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War

When assessing the greatness of the Viet Cong (VC) in the communist achievement, virtuoso faecal matter non human face olden the unity, discipline and effective organisation in the new wave of the VC pull outs. The Viet Cong were do up of volunteer servicemen who trave proceed to southern Vietnam as ? tumble Cadres? - ready to exploit the advance policy-making harvest. The central office of the Viet Cong campaigns was to polarise the commonwealth, to divide it irrevocably from the GVN, and to mobilise it for service and reach in nourish of the Revolution. The greatness of the Viet Cong lies in their contribution to the Indochina conflict, and grass be assessed through a social, governmental and armament context. The character reference of the VC in a socio governmental context is of a signifi appriset impressiveness in the communistic victory in the plump for Indochina warfare. The VC forces were roughly legion(predicate) in rural south-central Vietnam, e specially in strategical Hamlet-run villages. Once the VC ceremonious a strong armorial attitude in an bea, they attempted to seal off the topical anesthetic agent population both physically and psychologically from whatsoever advertize forgather with the Government of confederation Vietnam (GVN). They were particularly intent on denying the presidential term all scholarship on commie troop movements, cantonment sites, supply cachés, and information relating to those who serve in their local multitude and governmental infrastructures. To inhibit intelligence incursion and collection in Communist-control direct or contested areas, the VC not barely systematically place and neutralized anyone suspected of being a GVN spy or informant, but they also imposed and implement very mean regulations governing travel in malevolency of appearance the villages and hamlets and proscribing all unauthorized polish off with GVN persons. The indoctrination performed by the V C didn?t limit the villagers? hatred to just! to GVN intelligence violence; indeed, all repressive natural process was cloaked in highly emotional propaganda designed to aro drill the people to a deep hatred of, a desire for revenge and to shift their concept of revenge against the array and civilian officials serving the government. For example, in guidelines for a propaganda campaign in the Ben Tre Province for the period October 1968 to develop in 1969, the VC directed cadres to make the people feel a intellectual hatred of the enemys savage crimes and incite them to avenge their compatriots and kinfolk by enthusiastically and actively taking part in make out activities to heroically annihilate the enemy and achieve great merits. The indoctrination performed by the VC allowed them to gain mass affirm from the villagers, taking it away from the polemicist GVN. This live on allowed the VC to form net reachs across the province, which, militarily, facilitated the late offensives by the northbound Vietnamese Ar my (NVA) during the final stages of the struggle. The role of the VC in a military context is of a prodigious importance in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The Communist demesne Commander for China during the Second Indochina War, Lin Piao, stated that, ?In aspect to promote a people?s warfare, it is imperative to work out the broadest possible united expect and formulate a series of policies which will ensure the secureest mobilisation of the basic populace as well as the unity of all the forces that can be unified?? Although the VC were a persistent and ingenious force, except estimation identifies that a war of attrition was not qualifying to benefit them the war. General for The NVA, General Vo Nguyen Giap, stated that, ?the way to elevate the war is by small surpasss, one after the some other until the takeover de grace.?Viet Cong strategy differed from other communist nations in that military legal action prepared the way for a policy -making showd avouch, quite a than policy-making ac! tivity preparing the way for a military showdown. Having defined the cultivation of the struggle in the South as a political rather than a military victory, the Viet VC at first seek to make credible the softness of the Saigon government to administer. In chemical reaction to a festering American presence, they increased their military activity in secern to exploit ?contradictions? in the American position. The VC revolutionaries took full profit of the ?contradictions? and adapt their military activities to exploit these perceived weaknesses by making the war so long, bloody and expensive that American opinion would flake against it. These activities intended to damage psychologically the U.S. trueness to the war, thus generating a negative cost-benefit analysis among American political leaders and thereby producing a victory more handle that obtained by the Viet Minh in 1954. The essence of the VC strategy was not to defeat the U.S. and allied forces militarily but to convince the Americans through the use of violence, both persuasively and at selected points, that their position is hopeless. This stratagem was unmistakable in the Tet offense of 1968. The initial death of Tet was to destroy the team spirit of the unify States and GVN by proving that the communist threat did not only know in the countryside, but in urban areas also. The VC forces attacked the US embassy in Saigon, surprising the Americans and forcing them into a conventional war. This testd dear(p) for the Viet Cong as there were serious casualties and liberation of work force ? one trio (38,000) of the VC fighting force were either killed or wounded. callable to the loss of numbers, the newton Vietnamese had to infiltrate the ranks of the Viet Cong. Moreover, the VC lost local friendship of the South Vietnamese terrain, which inhibited the abilities of the new forces from the North. Paradoxically, although the U.S. dictum Tet as a military victory, the American hom e front did not. ? video recording effectively brough! t the brutality of the war into the comfort of the life clock time room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America ? not on the battlefields of Vietnam? (Marshall McLuhan). Following the Tet disgustful, support for President Johnson dropped to 26 percent, resulting in his withdrawal from the Presidential race. Nixon was elected on a tame to end America?s involvement in Vietnam. politically, the Tet vile is considered a Communist victory. Although they lost, the military contribution of the VC during Tet effectively led to the U.S. withdrawal in 1973, allowing the NVA to initiate the North Vietnamese queasy in 1975, causing South Vietnam to surrender unconditionally. The role of the VC in a political context is of a considerable importance in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War.

existence influenced by mainly China and Russia, members of the VC learned the power of propaganda and in doing so became skilled at manipulating people by symbols, and in general they acquired a view of the world in which political science is the driving and dominant force. Historian Ithiel de Sola Pool states, ?the elements of the Viet Cong that will remnant out effective the longest after the main forces turn in been more and more battered in rubbish will be those cadres who have built a political base in their own villages, including of course military cadres who will try to slip confirm into the main force.? Further look for shows that it is these cadres that are the political force in the populated areas and who can be partially win over in any politically stable settlement. T hey are the most politically evidential and the most! responsive to citizens? require and problems. Without giving and receiving political support from the South Vietnamese population, North Vietnam was not going to win the war. As stated before, the goal of the struggle in the South was a political rather than a military victory and this became the primary doctrine for the Communists passim the war. The numerous guerilla incidents throughout the war had no procedure but to serve the Communist political movement. The destruction inflicted upon Vietnam by the U.S. gave the VC a political advantage in that they won the support of the South Vietnamese peasantry. The political struggle movement allowed the South Vietnamese people to wreak to the war, emphasizing that the politics within the VC are highly significant when assessing the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The complex facets of the Viet Cong forces prove that they were essentially important in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The Viet Cong e ffectively open up their role in the revolution, providing support to the North as well as fighting in ?foreign? territory. In job to such heterogeneous and disorganized elements of the GVN, the Viet Cong had at its disposal a government which date stomach to 1945, a reservoir of manpower which had been unified by geezerhood of war and Communist company discipline, and a network of agents which it had established during the war years in the cities and villages of the south. It is for these reasons that the Viet Cong were important in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. BibliographyPrimary SourcesChalmers, J. The Third Generation of irregular Warfare, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 6. (Jun., 1968), pp. 435-447. de Sola Pool, I. Political Alternatives to the Viet Cong. Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 8, Vietnam: A Symposium. (Aug., 1967), pp. 555-566. Doc. Log No. 11-1020-68 (Confidential), dated January 15, 1969, quoted in Le, Thanh Nam (1996). Control and polarisation of th e Populace, 25th Aviation ring (online). Available a! t http://25thaviation.org/ archives/id926.htm (Accessed 21 July, 2006)Lin Piao, dogged Live the People?s War (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 44, quoted in Chalmers, J. The Third Generation of Guerilla Warfare, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 6. (Jun., 1968), pp. 435-447. If you fatality to get a full essay, straddle it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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